Preface |
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vii | |
Introduction |
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1 | (12) |
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Model I: The Rational Actor |
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13 | (64) |
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A Rigorous Model of Action |
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16 | (7) |
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A Rational Actor Paradigm |
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23 | (3) |
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The Classical Model Illustrated |
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26 | (22) |
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Neorealism (Structural Realism). |
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International Institutionalism. |
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Strategy, War, and Rational Choice. |
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Variants and Uses of the Classical Model |
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48 | (29) |
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The Cuban Missile Crisis: A First Cut |
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77 | (66) |
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Why Did the Soviet Union Decide to Place Offensive Missile in Cuba? |
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78 | (31) |
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Hypothesis 1: Cuban Defense. |
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Hypothesis 2: Cold War Politics. |
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Hypothesis 3: Missile Power. |
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Hypothesis 4: Berlin---Win, Trade, or Trap. |
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Why Did the United States Respond to the Missile Deployment with a Blockade? |
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109 | (12) |
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Alternative 1: Do Nothing. |
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Alternative 2: Diplomatic Pressures. |
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Alternative 3: A Secret Approach to Castro. |
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Alternative 5: Air Strike. |
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Why Did the Soviet Union Withdraw the Missiles? |
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121 | (22) |
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Model II: Organizational Behavior |
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143 | (54) |
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Organizational Logic and Efficiency |
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147 | (6) |
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Organizational Logic and Organizational Culture |
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153 | (5) |
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158 | (2) |
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160 | (3) |
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Organizational Behavior Paradigm |
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163 | (34) |
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The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Second Cut |
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197 | (58) |
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Deployment of Soviet Missiles in Cuba |
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201 | (16) |
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The Soviet Build-up in Detail. |
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Organizational Implementation. |
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Imposition of a U.S. Blockade of Cuba |
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217 | (19) |
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Organizational Intelligence. |
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Organizational Implementation. |
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The Withdrawal of Soviet Missiles from Cuba |
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236 | (19) |
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Model III: Governmental Politics |
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255 | (70) |
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The Governmental Politics Model Illustrated |
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258 | (5) |
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Separated Institutions Sharing Power. |
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Bargaining According to the Processes. |
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Power Equals Impact on Outcome. |
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Intranational and International Relations. |
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Group Processes and Their Effects on Choices and Action |
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263 | (31) |
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The ``Agency'' Problem: Principals, Agents, and Players. |
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Framing Issues and Setting Agendas. |
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Complexity of Joint Action. |
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A Governmental Politics Paradigm |
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294 | (31) |
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The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Third Cut |
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325 | (54) |
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The Imposition of a Blockade by the United States |
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329 | (18) |
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The Politics of Discovery. |
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Soviet Withdrawal of the Missiles from Cuba |
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347 | (32) |
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Soviets Kill an American U-2 Pilot. |
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The President and the Chairman. |
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The ``Deal'': Resolving the Turkish Problem. |
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The ``Deal'': Resolving the Cuban Problem. |
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379 | (29) |
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Summing Up: Differences in Interpretation |
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379 | (6) |
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Summing Up: Different Answers or Different Questions? |
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385 | (4) |
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Where Do We Go from Here? |
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389 | (19) |
Index |
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408 | |